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IDEOLOGY AS RESOURCE IN
ENTREPRENEURIAL JOURNALISM
The French online news startup Mediapart
Andrea Wagemans, Tamara Witschge, and Mark Deuze
The emergence of a startup culture in the ﬁeld of journalism is global: since the early years of the
twenty-ﬁrst century, new independent journalism companies have formed around the world.
Although setting up one’s own journalistic practice is not particularly novel in the news industry,
the last couple of years have witnessed exponential growth in the startup space. In this context
we chose to look more closely at one of the more successful recent online news startups: the
French siteMediapart. We were interested in the factors involved in creating and running a journal-
ism startup, and how the professionals involved give meaning to what they do in the fast-changing
journalism ﬁeld. We found that, although one of the main unique selling points of the journalism
professed at Mediapart is that it challenges and provides an alternative to mainstream French
press, at the heart of it is a strong traditional journalism ideology. While Mediapart has in many
ways challenged and inspired the ways in which other French news organizations operate, it
does not challenge our understanding of journalism, but rather reinforces a traditional and hom-
ogenous deﬁnition.
KEYWORDS entrepreneurial journalism; French media system; journalistic ideology; news
startup
Introduction
The emergence of a startup culture in the ﬁeld of journalism is global: since the early
years of the twenty-ﬁrst century, new independent (and generally small-scale and online-
only) journalism companies have formed around the world (for Europe, see Bruno and Kleis
Nielsen 2012; for Australia, see Simons 2013; for some US cases, see Schaffer 2010; Coates
Nee 2014). In the context of self-damaging business models (for print and broadcast), audi-
ences migrating to the digital space, and an organizational context rife with atypical
working conditions (International Labour Organization 2006), ongoing managerial over-
hauls, and declining editorial budgets, both newcomers and senior reporters choose, or
see a necessity, to strike out on their own. Although setting up one’s own journalistic prac-
tice—either within or outside of legacy news organizations—is not particularly new in the
news industry, in recent years there has been exponential growth in the startup space.
The current shift in focus to entrepreneurial journalism has not only taken place
within the industry. Researchers and educators have matched this attention with scholarly
work and curricular innovation, which further urges journalists to take on entrepreneurial-
ism as a core element in their identity (for a critical take, see Anderson 2014). Courses and
degrees in entrepreneurial journalism have been developed in countries as varied as the
United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Colombia, Mexico, and the Netherlands
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(Vázquez Schaich and Klein 2013; Mensing and Ryfe 2013). Emphasizing individual traits,
skills, attitude, and mindset, such curricular interventions envisage the future of journalism
in the form of journalists who (alone or in collaboration) are able to monetize content in
innovative ways, connect to publics in interactive new formats, grasp opportunities, and
respond to (and shape) its environment (Briggs 2012).
While the future of journalism is increasingly sought in both journalism practice and
education in this entrepreneurial form of journalism, we have to recognize the startup
space as profoundly precarious. Many, if not most companies fail to make it past good
intentions. Financing is scarce, competition ﬁerce, and costs can be high. Stress levels
among workers in the media industry are high, among those more or less securely
employed just as much as among independents (Ertel et al. 2005; Reinardy 2011). Diversi-
ﬁcation and cross-subsidizing editorial practice seem key to survival; the extent to which
this contributes to a potential compromising of journalistic standards and values remains
to be seen. What is clear is that journalism practice currently moves beyond traditional con-
ceptualizations of the ﬁeld as consisting of neatly organized core industries producing
media products for mass consumption. The ways of practicing journalism include a wide
(and widening) range of editorial, redactional, and curational settings taking place in all
kinds of organizational contexts.
To understand the ways in which these new startups impact on the ﬁeld and wider
understanding of journalism, we need rich, in-depth descriptions of cases of these new
forms of journalism, the new types of business models, and ways of practicing and perceiv-
ing journalism. To contribute to our understanding of the challenges and opportunities of
new forms of journalism, we provide in-depth insight into one of the more successful online
news startups: the French site Mediapart. It is one of the few news startups that have
managed to develop a sustainable business model for their online journalism, whereas
most other similar “pure players” in the ﬁeld seem to struggle to establish or hold on to
what tends to be a mix of different sources of revenue (if any; see Sirkkunen and Cook
2012).
The business model of Mediapart, that completely rejects the selling of advertising
space to pay its bills, was unique when it was launched in 2007 and there was a good
deal of initial skepticism about its chances of success. Alain Minc, who was president of
Le Monde’s supervisory board at the time, said that based on his experience in the
media business he was sure that the Mediapart model would never work. In an interview
with radio station France Info on October 10, 2008 he stated: “the model chosen by
Edwy Plenel is an absurd one. The online press cannot work except when it is free. A
paid online press cannot work.”1
By succeeding,Mediapart not only challenges these industry preconceptions, but also
scholarly ones: existing theories about business models in journalism suggest that newspa-
pers always depend on cross-subsidies (whether from advertising or public funding) to
some extent. According to Kaye and Quinn (2010), the revenues from selling content
were never high enough to cover the expenses, and Briggs (2012, 15) adds “the most dama-
ging misconception that still pervades the newspaper industry today is the belief that con-
sumers used to pay for their news.” He claims readers have never actually paid for content
and this is not going to be common in the digital age either, even though media have been
exploring the options for charging content online.
Mediapart is an interesting case to investigate not only because of its unique and suc-
cessful business model. We see that the subscription model is becoming more common,





























though its longer-term success is not as clear in each of these cases as it is in the case of
Mediapart—see, for instance, De Correspondent in the Netherlands, Krautreporter in
Germany, or The Atavist Magazine in the United States. What makesMediapart a particularly
interesting case is that outsiders describe it as a unique case, while the company regards
itself as a laboratory, as a nouvelle presse project that is exploring the digital age and
might serve as an example for other journalism startups. By investigating Mediapart
closely, we gain insight into both its uniqueness and the extent to which this forms a lab-
oratory for other cases.
A Unique Laboratory for New Forms of Journalism
Mediapart was founded in 2007 by Edwy Plenel (former editor-in-chief at Le Monde),
François Bonnet (Libération, Le Monde), Laurent Mauduit (Libération, Le Monde), Gérard
Desportes (Libération), and Marie-Hélène Smiejan. These senior journalists wanted to
create an independent online newspaper focused on investigative journalism and reinvent
a business model for journalism based completely on paid subscriptions.
What sets Mediapart apart from other online-only platforms is ﬁrst that it bills itself as
an online newspaper publishing three daily editions (rather than continuous updates). The
stories that are included in these editions are selected and prioritized on the basis of
relevance, and not just the time of publication. The same story is sometimes republished
in multiple editions. In addition to these newspaper-like articles, Mediapart also offers its
subscribers video content in the form of Web documentaries, self-produced talk shows
(Mediapart Live, Objections, Contre-courant), and a weekly video column of comedian
Didier Porte. Second, an important part of the website is dedicated to what they call Le
Club, the interactive platform where people can comment on articles, publish their own
blogs, and engage in discussions with other people, experts, and journalists.Mediapart jour-
nalists also use this part of the website to publish stories that interest them personally.
Third, Mediapart organizes events like ofﬂine debates, festivals, and rallies that further
and extend the discussions held on the platform, such as an event to support Greece or
the battle against corruption. Fourth, part of the newspaper and Le Club are also available
in an English and Spanish edition. All in all, it becomes clear that Mediapart is a company
with a diversiﬁed, multi-media strategy. In this article, we will discuss the ways in which
these elements come together in a successful new type of news organization.
Key for this article focusing on the entrepreneurial aspects of new journalism is that
Mediapart aims to be an independent medium that does not rely on advertisers for its
business model. Full stories are accessible through a paid subscription at the relatively
low price of €9 a month, while the homepage and Le Club can be accessed for free. As
such, there are a number of aspects that set Mediapart apart from other digital media start-
ups. In France, at the time, it was unique in the sense that it was a news medium that did
not rely in any way on selling advertisement space. It was the only news site in France that
did not, and still does not, have advertisements. Ofﬂine, there was already Le Canard
Enchainé and in the audiovisual domain there was also website @rret sur images. In the
meantime, online media like Contexte (in 2013) and Brief.me (in 2014) were created that
also denounce advertising.
Internationally, the idea of a paywall was still a rare policy in the media industry when
Mediapart adopted this strategy. The Wall Street Journal had successfully installed the ﬁrst
online paywall in 1997, but was alone in that policy. According to The Conversation, the





























paywall debate only took off in 2009, two years after Mediapart was created.2 The New York
Times introduced a paywall in 2011, The Times (London) in 2012, but this is all considerably
later than the French startup. Moreover, in many of these cases we are dealing with
metered paywalls. In the case of Mediapart all content except the homepage (with short
introductions to the articles) was behind a paywall from the outset. In France too, this is
a relatively unique feature, as is also remarked in research conducted in 2010 that examined
24 online media in France (Couve and Kayser-Bril 2010). The researchers concluded that the
“freemium”model was by far the most used model, making special mention of the distinc-
tiveness of Mediapart’s model.
Given these speciﬁc characteristics of the news platform, the following research ques-
tion drove the research presented here: what are the factors involved in creating and
running Mediapart, and how do the news professionals involved give meaning to what
they do in their working environment? We deliberately chose a descriptive general ques-
tion, since the space of news startups is relatively under-researched, and existing work
tends to deﬁne survival and success more or less exclusively in business terms (Sirkkunen
and Cook 2012; Naldi and Picard 2012; Küng 2015, 91ff).
The analysis presented here is based on interviews with the founders and a docu-
ment analysis of the business plan, the annual budgets, the mission statement, and the
Mediapart Live edition covering this subject (interviews and analysis conducted in 2014
and 2015). Together they offer insight into the creation of Mediapart, the events leading
up to it, the choices made, and the difﬁculties faced. The analysis of business-related
documents, like Mediapart’s budget, business plan, and mission statement, offered
insight into the business creation, the steps taken, the objectives, and the choices
made. This was also covered in the manifesto Combat pour une presse libre (in 2008)
and the revised manifesto Le droit de savoir (in 2013), both written by co-founder and
president Edwy Plenel. Semi-structured interviews with Plenel and two other co-founders
further enriched this data with anecdotes, hesitations, challenges, and successes while
creating and running Mediapart, while semi-structured interviews with journalists
working at Mediapart and founders of other French startups gave insight in the day-
to-day routines at Mediapart, how Mediapart differs from established media organiz-
ations, how the journalists give meaning to working in this new type of media organiz-
ation, how this relates to their professional objectives and in what ways it affected
French journalism.
The people we interviewed at Mediapart itself were: Edwy Plenel (founder and presi-
dent), Christophe Gueugneau (editor-in-chief), Laurent Mauduit (co-founder and econ-
omics editor), Pierre Puchot (international editor), Stéphane Alliès (political editor), Lucie
Delaporte (education editor), and François Bonnet (editorial director). The founders of
other French startups we interviewed were: Nicolas George (pigiste [Freelance] for i>Télé,
RTL, and Le Routard), Jean-Christophe Boulanger (founder and president of Contexte),
and Laurent Mauriac (founder of Rue89 and Brief.me).
The 10 interviews were conducted between November 2014 and January 2015. Each
interview lasted for about an hour (two were conducted over the phone, two in a cafe, one
at the home of the interviewee, the other ﬁve in ofﬁces of the interviewees). As entrepre-
neurial journalism is still a relatively new ﬁeld of study, we employed a grounded theory
approach to code and analyze the results. The number of people we interviewed is
limited, and the interview data only begin to explore the experiences, motivations, and
emotions of the journalists involved. However, the variety of perspectives does provide a





























diverse account of Mediapart as a journalism startup and the role it plays in French journal-
ism. Furthermore, the analysis of the data clearly identiﬁed shared experiences, allowing us
to venture beyond the case of Mediapart and reﬂect on wider practices of entrepreneurial
journalism.
In this article, we will start by contextualizing our research of this case by situating it
in our understanding of entrepreneurial journalism. We address the importance of a broad
deﬁnition of resources in examining entrepreneurship and the need to consider the role
that ideology plays in creative enterprises such as startups in journalism. We will then
apply these concepts, resources, and ideology to the speciﬁc case of Mediapart and
show the way that ideology becomes one of the most important ways to point out (and
sell) the uniqueness of the organization. We critically interrogate the ways in which Media-
part argues it is different from traditional organizations, and reﬂect on the limits of the chal-
lenge that this entrepreneurial project provides to the understanding of journalism.
Setting Up a New News Organization
The direct event leading up to the creation of Mediapart was the acquisition of Le
Monde by the investment group Lagardère in 2005 and the resulting departure of then
editor-in-chief Edwy Plenel. He explains how he warned about the consequences of the
acquisition, but during the general assembly only 36 percent of the journalists voted
against the proposition and so Le Monde was purchased by the investment group. Plenel
left the newspaper on October 30, 2005—remembering the exact date when talking
about it in the interview.
Laurent Mauduit resigned as assistant editor-in-chief, but continued to undertake
investigative journalism for Le Monde for another year. The direct event causing him to
resign was the censoring of part of his investigative story on then president of Le
Monde’s supervisory board Alain Minc. According to François Bonnet, it is a French
peculiarity that all media are owned by companies whose main occupation is not infor-
mation, but arms, telecom, concrete, or something else. These relationships between
business owners, investors, government, and the media fueled the founders’ wish to
create an independent medium.
There was some momentum in 2007. First, key personnel were available—Plenel,
Mauduit, and other journalists who had exited Le Monde. Second, with his settlement
payment from the newspaper, Plenel was in a position to invest in the Mediapart project.
The founders were experienced and renowned journalists who wanted to create an inde-
pendent medium, by which they mainly refer to economic independence. An online
venture was less expensive than setting up a print medium, allowed for interaction with
readers, and gave them a ﬁrst mover’s advantage in 2007, as Mediapart was one of the
ﬁrst online media to succeed with a business model that completely eliminated advertise-
ment sales as a source of revenue.
But although the founders had extensive journalistic experience, none had set up or
run a business previously. As Laurent Mauduit recounts, this inﬂuenced their business
decisions. For example, the initial team comprised 25 journalists, one technician, and
one administrative employee. The founders saw themselves creating a newspaper and to
do that they needed journalists. They were barely aware that creating an online business
also requires a general manager, ﬁnancial manager, marketing department, and a technical
support team. When the website crashed because the ﬁrst scoop increased trafﬁc, they had





























to hire more technical staff. It took three years before they hired Estelle Coulon who
manages online marketing and who has expanded the marketing team. As Laurent
Mauduit recounts:
We were crazy, crazy, crazy, it was madness. Madness because we said we are doing jour-
nalism, so we need journalists, but we didn’t understand that we were creating a business,
so we also needed a general director in charge of ﬁnancial matters, a marketing specialist,
etcetera.
The founders deliberately chose a business model and medium that were new to
them, but that allowed for independent journalism, interaction with readers, and required
less ﬁnancial capital to create than a print medium. Despite their lack of business experi-
ence—and the way this biased their choices towards the journalism rather than the
business side of the enterprise—they managed to successfully create and run this journal-
ism startup. They beneﬁted from the variety of resources they possessed as renowned jour-
nalists, as they could more easily access capital, manage their creative employees, and
become visible.
Despite the absence of a marketing department, Mediapart became known and
visible quickly, as becomes clear from the number of mentions in French media.3 The inter-
views conducted for this research (with people both within and outside of Mediapart)
suggest this can be in part explained by the charisma and symbolic capital of founder
and president Edwy Plenel. Already a public ﬁgure before starting Mediapart, he describes
his own role as president ofMediapart as being the spokesperson of the business. Stéphane
Alliès explains how personiﬁcation is something typically French and can be identiﬁed with
all the big printed press institutions. According to other startup founders, it was a deliberate
choice made by the founders to construct the newspaper around the personality of Edwy
Plenel with his big moustache and reputation. It is a choice that was not without risk,
because Plenel is a divisive personality, loved by some but hated by others. To gauge his
role amidst the other features that helped make this case a successful case, we need to
identify the features that help us understand entrepreneurship.
Understanding Entrepreneurial Journalism
To understand the way in which journalism startups function, in this case Mediapart,
we need to look at the broader context of startups. For the purposes of this research, a
startup is considered to be a small or medium-sized enterprise (SME) with less than 250
employees (Powell and Ennis 2007, 376). For the journalism part of entrepreneurial journal-
ism, we can further deﬁne it as a startup organization that identiﬁes with journalism as it has
historically been practiced, is not afﬁliated with existing media, and mainly operates online,
while innovating journalism in some way (Bruno and Kleis Nielsen 2012, 3–4), for example,
by producing a different kind of journalistic content or by creating a new viable business
model. Mediapart claims to do both. In its 2014 annual report, Edwy Plenel writes:
In its six years of existence, Mediapart has become known for its original, new and exclu-
sive information. But what is not sufﬁciently known yet is that this digital newspaper
without equivalent is also an economic exception in the French press.
The term “entrepreneurial journalism” has attracted considerable attention, both in
the industry and in academia. It marries two parts long seen as needing to be separate,





























even at times in one individual, the entrepreneurial journalist: the business side of the
enterprise and the journalistic side of the enterprise. Those two sides interact and inﬂuence
the success of the startup. This combination often leads to tension, particularly in the case
of companies and organizations within the broader ﬁeld of the creative industries, of which
the news industry is part.
Creative industries are “those activities which have their origin in individual creativity,
skill and talent and which have a potential for wealth and job creation through the gener-
ation and exploitation of intellectual property” (Townley, Beech, and McKinlay 2009, 939).
Creative industries face speciﬁc managerial challenges as the nature of their products is
symbolic, experiential, and of non-utilitarian value (ibid). Because of those unpredictable
aspects, creative businesses employ strategies to manage risk, and risk determines both
aspects of the enterprise—whether that enterprise is the portfolio career of an individual
entrepreneur or a large company. Creativity and commercial acumen thus both stand in
equal service of managing risk and uncertainty in the production of culture and cultural
work (Bilton 2007), particularly in the ﬁeld of journalism (Naldi and Picard 2012).
For the news organization—whether that is a large-scale legacy organization, a col-
laboration of a few people, or constituted by one individual entrepreneur—one of the main
challenges is how to balance the public service that journalism seeks or professes to
provide and the economic interests (Picard 2005). Both of these aspects are important to
consider when understanding entrepreneurial journalism: whereas studies in entrepreneur-
ship tend to focus on the economic aspects, to understand the “journalism” part of the
equation, we also need to consider the speciﬁc nature of the journalistic profession and
its position in societies. Here we will consider more in detail two concepts that help our
analysis, resources and professional ideology, as well as the relationships between them.
Resources
Crucial to understanding startups is to note that resources include, but are not limited
to, the ﬁnancial capital available to those setting up a journalistic organization. It also refers
to different types of capital needed to create and run a business, as suggested by Naldi and
Picard (2012). Capital is a useful concept when analyzing business formation in the news
industry, because it allows us to distinguish between different types of resources, the
relationships between those different forms of resources, and how possessing one type
of resource makes it easier to acquire other types of resource. The role that resources
play in business formation is especially interesting for the creation of Mediapart, because
its founders had worked at and managed renowned French newspapers before establish-
ing their own venture. This suggests they may have had better access to initial ﬁnancial
capital, a useful social network, and a reputation that gave them an advantage over
young entrepreneurs in the same situation. Naldi and Picard (2012, 69–97) identify
limited access to capital as one of the main reasons why startup enterprises ultimately
fail, and though the existence of resources can never entirely explain the success of an
organization, it can help us understand Mediapart’s endurance.
Resources entail social, economic, and symbolic capital. Social capital refers to the
network that business founders can make use of, such as ties with journalists, sources,
the business community, and community organizations (Naldi and Picard 2012). Johannis-
son (1988, 83) ascribes crucial importance to social capital when he states “the key to entre-
preneurial success is found in the ability to develop and maintain a personal network. The





























personal network is the vehicle by which the established entrepreneur exchanges infor-
mation with and acquires resources from the environment.” Also, founders have a head
start when they do not have to build up this network, but can make use of the network
they already have as capital is cumulative. It allows the entrepreneur to attract economic
capital, which includes the initial ﬁnancial capital the founders have at their disposal,
their monetary income, and personal assets. Economic capital can also be accessed
through a strong personal network. It is important to note that, contrary to the idea that
anyone can now be a journalist by starting their own business, launching a digital
medium still requires signiﬁcant investment (Tessier 2007, 40; Curran and Witschge
2010). So even though the online production and distribution costs are much lower than
those of a printed medium, economic capital is a ﬁnancial precondition for creating a
business (though not necessarily sufﬁcient for making it run successfully).
Social and symbolic capital play a role in both attracting economic capital and
running a startup as Johannisson (1988, 87) states, the “entrepreneur’s organization is basi-
cally an extension of his personality, whether formally represented by his employees or by a
personal network.” Johannisson places great emphasis on the role of the entrepreneur and
his personal traits in the ability to maintain a social network. These personal traits can be
understood as what Townley, Beech, and McKinlay (2009, 944) call symbolic capital: “the
legitimacy or respect proffered according to terms valued within the ﬁeld; prestige reﬂect-
ing knowledge of, and recognition within, the ﬁeld.” These can be acquired, for example,
through prior entrepreneurial and business experience, prior experience in related indus-
tries or prior experience in other industries. Charisma is also a form of symbolic capital. Fur-
thermore, intellectual capital (creative ideas) and cultural capital (particular knowledge and
skills, the ownership of cultural goods, recognized authority or expertise) play an important
role as personal traits allowing one to build and maintain a personal network.
Social capital and symbolic capital play an important role in addressing the manage-
rial challenges faced while running a creative business like Mediapart. The central point
made in theories about the speciﬁcs of managing creative business is that the goals and
vision of creative businesses are the temporary outcomes of perpetual discussion
between the managers and the employees (Powell and Dodd 2007; Townley, Beech, and
McKinlay 2009). In the case of Mediapart, the founders’ reputations and prior experience
indicate a profound knowledge of how journalism works, providing them with some lever-
age over their journalists in these discussions, as we will discuss in more detail below.
Ideology
The managerial challenges faced by creative businesses like those in journalism can
be softened signiﬁcantly if the professional goals of creative employees of the organization
relate to the organizational goals of the business. It is the tension between managing
resources and upholding values that is central in analyzing entrepreneurial journalism.
Many of these challenges come to the fore at the level of everyday practices: how do
they manifest in the work and in the self-understanding of the professional? We therefore
also looked at how journalists experience working atMediapart and the extent to which the
practices at Mediapart align with its employees’ professional values.
One of the main critiques of entrepreneurial journalism is that it could exacerbate the
trend in the ﬁeld of journalism that suggests that professional values are increasingly set
aside to meet more commercial goals in the face of declining revenues (Van Zoonen





























1998; Witschge and Nygren 2009). The case ofMediapart is particularly interesting as certain
market considerations—for example, expressed in seeking advertising revenues—are not a
part of Mediapart’s business model. At the same time, there are commercial interests at
hand: Mediapart relies on people subscribing. The question then is if, and in what ways,
commercial decisions affect journalistic decisions.
When considering the balance between commercial interests and professional values
—such as editorial independence and autonomy—that make up the occupational ideology
of journalism (Deuze 2005), it is important to look beyond individual factors surrounding
the journalism startup and consider the political and societal context of business formation
that may either frustrate or spur business development. What is important to recognize is
that, in the case of journalism, looking at economic motives and resources will not provide
the whole picture.
As Naldi and Picard (2012, 69–97) explain, one of the main reasons for starting a new
journalism business is the job destruction at existing media companies, the discontent with
existing journalism, and the demise of legacy media institutions (notably newspapers).
Journalism startups in France as well as in other countries are therefore more often than
not framing themselves as a counterforce, renewing journalism with independent investi-
gations (Küng 2015). As Sirkkunen and Cook (2012, 52) note: “several sites pride themselves
on independent quality journalism that rejects the status quo—even one might say cashing
in on a counter-culture that stands for independent, investigative journalism.”
The Relevance of Resources
When we consider both aspects of entrepreneurship in the case of Mediapart,
resources and ideology, we ﬁrstly see the unique set of resources available to Mediapart.
In the above introduction of how Mediapart was established, we discussed the set of
actors who were involved and the type of capital they brought into the organization.
The case of Mediapart illustrates how both economic capital and social capital are crucial
in meeting the requirements for creating a startup. A network of friends and acquaintances
who were willing to invest some money and the availability of the founder’s personal ﬁnan-
cial assets allowed them to raise the initial capital needed to launch the online newspaper.
However, our case also shows how, in a way, they had to start all over despite their
ﬁnancial assets, extensive social networks, and reputations. They did struggle ﬁnancially
during the ﬁrst three years, as their symbolic capital did not help them in convincing inves-
tors that Mediapart would be a viable business decision. Thus they were mostly reliant on
their own capital and the goodwill of their friends and acquaintances. WhenMediapart was
launched, it had collected €2,939,000 in initial capital. The personal investments of the
founders constituted €1,325,000. Next to that there were two bigger investors, namely
Doxa and Ecoﬁnance (each about €500,000, totaling €1,110,000). Third, the Société des
Amis de Mediapart, consisting of about 40 friends, acquaintances, and other sympathizers
that each invested between €5,000 and €50,000, contributed a total amount of €504,000.4
This combination of investors is key to understanding how Mediapart was able to
launch. Given that the motivation of the founders was primarily located in its ideology,
not in a business model, “regular” investors were difﬁcult to attract. General director
Marie-Hélène Smiejan, who handles the ﬁnancial side of the business, explained:





























We were not at all beginners, we had professional, editorial and management experience,
so we went to see potential partners. They all told us no. It was either the press never
makes any money, so it will always lose money. Or it was, but what exactly is your
project, it’s to earn a lot of money? But no. No, it’s that the newspaper exists, develops,
takes its readers into account, yes, well, but our goal is to make money … It’s risky, an
independent newspaper, because why would you want us to invest in it?
So the founders were forced to rely on their own resources and decided to invest in
the project themselves. A beneﬁcial side-effect of this decision was that it gave other small
investors more conﬁdence in the project. If the founders were willing to invest in it them-
selves, maybe it was a project worth investing in. In addition, the small investors—the
Société des Amis—invested more out of support for Mediapart’s cause than for economic
reasons.
Although creating and running an online medium is less expensive than creating a
print medium, the venture still required approximately €5 million in investment in its
ﬁrst three years in operation. The choice of a paywall model (modèle payant) was especially
risky, as it requires content to attract subscribers and thus needs a large team of journalists
from the start to create this content. In 2010, the costs were €3.5 million, 70 percent of
which was staff costs for 33 employees, of whom 25 were journalists (Couve and Kayser-
Bril 2010). Of the initial team of 25 journalists, 19 were promised the same salary as the
job they had to leave in order to join Mediapart and a three-year contract. This helped con-
vince journalists who were hesitant to join Mediapart from the outset. François Bonnet
recounts how there were not many applications, because people considered it a crazy
project. However, for their business model to work they needed journalists with knowledge
and expertise concerning investigative stories about politics, economics, education, and
the police; and who were also willing to work differently from how they were used to at
printed media. They found these journalists with a lot of symbolic capital by asking speciﬁc
colleagues (“par des reseaux professionelles de chacun”) in their networks. This in turn
attracted young journalists like Pierre Puchot, Lucie Delaporte, and Stéphane Alliès who
were interested in working with these well-known senior journalists.
The venture grew from 25 people, mostly journalists, to an organization of more than
50 people, consisting of four elements:
. The editorial section with about 35 journalists, which is located in Paris and managed
by co-founder François Bonnet as the editorial director.
. The technical department, with about 10 staffers, which is located in Paris and
managed by Etienne Samsom.
. The marketing department, with about 4 staffers, which is located in Paris and
managed by Estelle Coulon.
. Subscribers relations, which is located in Poitiers and managed by Marine Santain.
As this French startup was a relatively new type of organization, those involved faced
legislative challenges, notably when it came to taxation policy. Until February 2014 the
French government clearly distinguished between the printed press, on the one hand,
and websites, on the other, for VAT purposes. The printed press enjoyed a reduced rate
of 2.1 percent, while websites had to pay the normal rate of 19.6 percent. After the new
press syndicate SPIIL lobbied for equal VAT rates for all media, including online newspapers,
the government eventually equalized the rate. Now all media organizations pay 2.1





























percent. In the endMediapartmanaged to become a successful organization, both in terms
of proﬁtability (the entrepreneurial aspect of it) and in terms of their self-classiﬁcation as a
journalistic success (which is discussed in the next section). After an initial loss, the organ-
ization reached ﬁnancial equilibrium in 2010 and has been increasingly proﬁtable in sub-
sequent years (see Table 1).
Ideology as Resource
Being a new organization brought challenges and many resources were needed to
address the challenges. But Mediapart became increasingly popular, in particular after
what has become known as the Bettencourt affair. The organization grew to more than
10,000 subscribers in their ﬁrst six months,5 then gradually doubled, and after the huge
scoop about the Bettencourt affair in July 2010, the subscription numbers increased
from 26,000 to 42,000.6 There was steady growth in 2011,7 in 2012,8 and in 2013, taking
the number of subscribers to the 100,000 mark.
It is clear that the Bettencourt affair was very important in the growth of the number
of subscribers. This involved the publication of secretly taped phone calls which implicated
former UMP treasurer and then Minister of Employment Éric Woerth with having received
€50,000 from L’Oréal billionaire Liliane Bettencourt through his wife, who was working for
the 92-year-old Bettencourt at the time.9 Le Monde had passed on the recordings of tele-
phone conversations with Bettencourt, as had Le Nouvel Observateur. Management at Med-
iapart, however, decided to go with the story. Between publication of the Bettencourt story
in June 2010 and the end of the year 2010, the number of subscribers almost doubled
(26,000 to 46,870). In their annual report of 2011, they wrote: “after two years of steady
growth in terms of audience and subscriptions, the Bettencourt affair allowed Mediapart
to pass a tipping point.”
The tapes’ controversy not only allowed them to break a big investigative story, it also
strengthened their claim that the existing media in France were not doing their job cor-
rectly. By refusing to publish the information about corruption offered to them, Le
Monde and Le Nouvel Observateur supported Mediapart’s argument that they were
keeping important information from their readers for the wrong reasons. As such, Media-
part is a clear example of a new entrepreneurial project challenging the status quo in
the ﬁeld of journalism, and ideology seems to be one of their strongest assets.
In its manifesto, Mediapart states that France is in need of a new press and Mediapart
is this project. They refer to their belief that existing media are not doing investigative
TABLE 1
Mediapart’s revenues and proﬁt per year (in euros)





































journalism and are no longer independent, which limits them in performing their demo-
cratic duty to inform the public. Mediapart claims to be reinventing journalism in France.
Borne out of a joint enterprise of journalists and Web specialists, the startup says it aims
to respond to three crises: democratic, economic, and moral. The economic crisis refers
to the lack of a viable business model as readers are leaving, advertisement revenues are
falling, and debts are increasing. This is a crisis because a ﬁnancially unstable press is a
weak press (“une presse fragile est une presse faible”), according to Plenel.
Interestingly, through addressing this economic “crisis,” Mediapart aims to address
the moral crisis they identify in journalism. This crisis for them is connected to the economic
crisis: as they see it, the fragility of newspapers causes a destabilization of journalistic
values, morals, and professional culture when the economic dependence of newspapers
on advertisers, corporations, or government limit them in their editorial choices. Which
brings them to the ﬁnal crisis, the democratic crisis, by which they mean the presidential
system in France which, they argue, allows one powerful person to dictate the journalistic
agenda. Through these evaluations of the press in France, Edwy Plenel argues that Media-
part might serve as an example for other journalism businesses in France and internation-
ally both in the way they have organized their business model and in the way they do
journalism.
Challenging the Status Quo
This strong ideological stance, which can be identiﬁed as a return to “traditional” jour-
nalistic values while challenging traditional media organizations, provides interesting
insights into both how this entrepreneurial project perceives (and sells) itself, as well as
how it considers other media businesses. By talking about what sets it apart, those involved
provide an interesting dichotomy distinguishing themselves from others. Each concept
used to describe Mediapart has a counterpart that describes the traditional press in
France for them. These distinctions were made, both at the level of the organization
(Table 2), and at the level of the journalism they produce (Table 3).
Towards a New Organization of Journalism?
Tables 2 and 3 show how Mediapart not only challenges the conceptualization of
journalism in France, but also reinvents the way that a journalistic organization can be orga-
nized. In its self-conceptualization we can ﬁnd many negations of the traditional press in
France. Compared to the printed media the founders had managed before, Mediapart is
a much smaller, more ﬂexible organization and less hierarchical. The editors-in-chief
state that they can primarily focus on journalistic work, because the combination of
doing journalism online and relying on a business model that primarily gets its revenues
from paid subscriptions eliminates the need to please advertisers, eliminates the pro-
duction and distribution costs, and eliminates the need for a 200–300-person team.
The journalists also feel they are much less preoccupied with organizational issues
like time, length, and revenues, which allows them to focus more fully on producing
what they consider good journalism. Most of the Mediapart journalists had worked at
other renowned media before joining the new startup, and a number had even left com-
fortable jobs for it. They reference the value of contact with readers, both virtually and in
reality, the liberty that they experience and the time and space they get to produce their





























work. Moreover, they state they are not limited by the institutional agenda as journalists at
traditional media often are, but instead are completely free to choose their own subjects as
opposed to media where they worked previously. There they were much more tied to the
news of the day and to orders from the editor-in-chief. At Mediapart, the initiative is with
the journalists. The journalists describe how they felt limited at their former employers.
They were not practicing what they believed journalism should be. They were guided by
external factors. More generally, they feel free to practice what they regard as good journal-
ism. Lucie Delaporte states that she is completely free to choose her own subjects, as long
as it is a story that is different from that which other media do.
TABLE 2
Differences in organizational features between Mediapart and traditional press according to
people working at Mediapart
Organization features Mediapart French press
Income model Subscriptions Advertisement/investors
Business model: proﬁtability Proﬁtable Losing money/sold off to
investors
Ownership Independent Owned by corporations




Income ﬂow Stable Unstable
Organization size Small Large
Type of organization Horizontal Hierarchic
Establishment of news
agenda
Free choice by journalists Appointed by editors
Organization of news beats
and journalist work
Together, working with different
colleagues in multiple domains
Divided, each journalist
working on own news beat
Age of employees Young and old people Mostly old people
Culture Dynamic Established
TABLE 3
Differences in journalism produced between Mediapart and traditional press according to
people working at Mediapart
Organization features Mediapart French press
Journalism model Anglo-Saxon French
Agenda set by Investigation Other media and the political agenda
Produced for The public The audience
Amount of articles Few Many
Type of questioning Pugnacious Polite/lazy
Differentiation Unique identity Homogenization
Aim of output Quality Quantity
Rhythm of publishing Distinct editions Continuous stream of articles
Editorial decision making Selective, exclusive Copy–paste culture
Afﬁnity Close to the public Close to those in power
Sourcing of stories Original sources “Usual suspects”
Length of output Long Short
Depth of output Profound Superﬁcial
Output on site ordered by Most important Most recent





























However, it is important to note that, although there may be signiﬁcant differences in
practice, a lot of this pertains to discourse. For instance, the idea that Mediapart is a hori-
zontally, democratically organized company is to a large extent more in discourse than
in practice. In reality there are two chiefs, Edwy Plenel and François Bonnet, and there
are others who perform “management” roles, though they are not necessarily named as
such. Christophe Gueugneau, for instance, who is editor-in-chief together with Sophie
Dufau, explained that his responsibilities are those of an editor-in-chief, but his title is jour-
nalist. Together they form the part of the organizational structure that is referred to as le
central and falls under editorial director François Bonnet.
Equally, the Mediapart founders employ a strong type of public service discourse
(Witschge and Nygren 2009; Sirkkunen and Cook 2012), referring to “the citizens’ right to
know” and “for democracy,” which is not always equally performed in practice. It presents
itself as a unique medium that is an “economic exception,” “unequalled,”with “original, new
and exclusive content.” However, the journalists do not seem to agree with the founders
about the larger goal of Mediapart. They are skeptical about the extent to which Mediapart
is able to fulﬁll a civic responsibility. The people they are seeking to convince are the people
who are interested in this already, says Christophe Gueugneau. According to the journalists,
Mediapart’s goal is therefore not to reinvent journalism, but to simply do journalism as it has
been ideologically supposed to be done. As such, it becomes clear that challenging the
status quo by reverting to traditional values (such as truth-telling in the context of complete
editorial autonomy and independence) becomes one of the most important resources
available to Mediapart.
Indeed, what Mediapart produces—investigative journalism—is not new content
wise. What they did do successfully is to repackage it in different formats, like videos
and podcasts, and the online environment allows for more interaction. But here too, we
see that the practice does not always live up to the ideal: journalists admitted that inter-
action with users was mainly useful in the starting phase of the new medium, when the
readership resembled more of a community. As the startup grows, the relevant comments
and suggestions from readers are usually only those sent to the journalists in an e-mail or
private message, not those on the site. Indeed, like other organizations, Mediapart also
upholds a clear distinction between content produced by readers and content produced
by journalists, emphasizing the fact that these are two different things. As such, the
status of the contributions of citizens remains up for negotiation (for a typology of the
types of interactivity in online news spaces, see Peters and Witschge 2014).
Mediapart’s focus on what sets the venture apart is both a burden and a blessing in
the daily work of the journalists. Journalists at Mediapart explain that they could be per-
ceived as arrogant, because they are telling other journalists that they are not producing
“proper” journalism. Lucie Delaporte, education editor, describes how education editors
working at other media do not do investigative journalism in the education ﬁeld,
because that is not what is expected of them. At Mediapart, her argument goes, there is
space for such investigations. Sources too, would notice such differences. Stéphane
Alliès, political editor, describes that sources experience greater liberty at explaining their
statements, because they know there is room for longer quotes in Mediapart’s articles.
What becomes clear is that billing the new entrepreneurial project as reinventing
journalism is a clever technique to gain visibility and it has been useful in attracting
readers and funding. The public service nature of the message has clearly spoken to ideo-
logical motivations of people to support the new business venture. It has proved effective





























in capitalizing on the founders’ social capital. This does not mean that the newcomer has
not instigated some real changes in the ﬁeld. They did provide impetus for investigative
journalism, which is relatively uncommon in France (Kuhn 2013), driving legacy media
like Le Monde, Le Nouvel Observateur, and Le Point to invest in their own investigative
units. Le Monde even rehired Fabrice Lhomme from Mediapart after he broke the Betten-
court story.
Mediapart also developed an online marketing strategy that legacy media adopted,
and it changed the playing ﬁeld for online journalism in France when it comes to rules and
regulations, allowing them to compete more equally with legacy media. As another startup
founder explained,Mediapart has been very innovative when it comes to marketing despite
their lack of a marketing department during the ﬁrst three years in existence. The most
inventive is the €1 trial period, which Le Monde and other large newspapers also
adopted. This suggests journalism startups can be an innovative factor in the journalism
ﬁeld that do not only change the ways in which their journalists work, but also the ways
in which existing media work.
Conclusion
The case ofMediapart provides useful insights into the new ways in which journalism
is produced, distributed, and conceptualized. One of the main ﬁndings offered here is how
the new entrepreneurial news organization aims to challenge the status quo in journalism,
both in terms of its organization and in terms of its ideology. At the same time, the ideology
that is professed ﬁts with the traditional conceptualization of journalism (Deuze 2005). All
the journalists working at Mediapart describe how they wanted to work there because the
practices at their previous employers did not match their view of journalism. The startup
does not so much change the professional identity of the journalists, but seems to offer
a place where they can work according to their own perceived professional identity. Put
differently, the professional identity precedes the startup and the startup offers an environ-
ment within which the journalists can express this professional identity in their work. Both
the founders and journalists ofMediapart argue that they feel liberated from organizational
issues and unconstrained by space or time. This implies that journalists are treated more
like “pure” professionals (adhering to a strict deﬁnition of reportorial autonomy) at Media-
part than they were at traditional media outlets.
There is an interesting paradox here: the organization professes (and is experienced
as such) to provide complete liberty and autonomy of the journalists while at the same time
there is a strong and homogenous work ethic and conceptualization of journalism.
Although it is less hierarchical than traditional news organizations, Mediapart is not as
democratically organized as the founders portray, nor do we ﬁnd truly alternative under-
standings and practices of journalism. The symbolic capital that can be found in some of
the key players in the organization allowed the organization (with strong-minded employ-
ees) to be managed effectively. This is mainly because the journalists working in the organ-
ization trust the decisions made by the two main leaders, François Bonnet and Edwy Plenel,
even when they do not always agree with them. A shared set of values and ways of working
was in part produced through the selection and hiring process, creating a group of like-
minded staff, and an environment where people (want to) work together. In doing so,
the inner workings of the startup do not differ from the relatively homogeneous working
environments and examples of group-think in legacy newsrooms.





























More generally, it seems like journalism startups in France are looking more at the
Anglo-Saxon journalistic culture than French tradition in constructing their businesses
(Reese 2001). This is to say that they are inspired by American businesses that already
exist, and they propagate a fact-based, objectivity-driven kind of journalism. Together
with their discourse of civic responsibility and the feeling of being almost completely
autonomous as journalists, their references to journalism are distinctly ideological—that
is, inspired by ideal-typical values (Deuze 2005). For all the freedom experienced in the
organization in determining what news to investigate and report on, the journalists still
expressed the need to address the biggest events of every day as one of the main chal-
lenges. As such, it seems that Mediapart, which in many ways, both ﬁnancially and journal-
istically, is innovative, still follows traditional ideological values that have governed
journalism for a long time (in this case immediacy). With a passionate return to traditional
journalistic ideological values as their unique selling point within the particular French
context, we may wonder whether—and if so how—entrepreneurial ventures, while chal-
lenging the status quo, in fact challenge conceptualizations of journalism. On the other
hand, the journalistic innovation in the case of Mediapart—combining collaboration with
an expert audience with an innovative business form, and an entrepreneurial organization
of work—suggests that a return and conﬁrmation of an ideal-typical core of journalism
does not necessarily stand in the way of new forms of journalism developing and ﬂourish-
ing. Ideology can be a resource for innovation as much as it works as a moat to hold off
invaders.
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NOTES
1. All quotes translated from French by the authors.
2. See http://theconversation.com/newspapers-ongoing-search-for-subscription-revenue-
from-paywalls-to-micropayments-40726.
3. Source: Wagemans (2014, appendix B), analysis of French media using a LexisNexis data-
base search with the keyword Mediapart, which went from 25 in the ﬁrst month of exist-
ence, to 537 in 2008 and 592 in 2009, to 2626 in 2010 (a rise that is mainly due to the
Bettencourt affair, see below).





7. Source: Mediapart annual report.
8. Source: http://www.frenchweb.fr/le-succes-de-mediapart-en-chiffres-et-en-images/104113.
9. See, for instance, http://www.theguardian.com/media/2010/jul/12/bettencourt-tapes-
mediapart.
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